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MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK:
LIFE AFTER DODD-FRANK
Meny Elgadeh*

INTRODUCTION
This Note examines the background of foreign-cubed litigation, 1
including its development over the past four decades, its abrogation by
the Supreme Court, and its potential future under recently enacted
legislation. The Note examines the tests developed by the Court of
Appeals in order to determine whether a United States court could
adjudicate foreign-cubed litigation.
Additionally, it reviews the
Supreme Court opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and its
ultimate rejection of the predominant Second Circuit test for
applicability. Finally, the Note discusses “The Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” a provision of which was
specifically included to overturn the result in the Morrison decision, its
potential impact on future foreign-cubed litigation, and how the courts,
litigants, and foreign nations should look to proceed in its wake.

I. FOREIGN-CUBED LITIGATION: BACKGROUND
A. SECURITIES LAWS: A BRIEF HISTORY
The issues and events surrounding the stock market crash known as
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2007, Brooklyn
College, City University of New York; B.S., 2005, Brooklyn College, City University
of New York. I would like to thank my wife, Valerie, for her support, encouragement,
and patience throughout the Note process. I would also like to thank my family and
friends, and particularly David Slarskey for his insightful feedback.
1. Foreign-cubed (“F-cubed”) litigation is generally described as an action
between a foreign investor and a foreign issuer whose securities are listed on a foreign
exchange. See e.g. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Securities Litigation, 2009 SEC. L.
REV. § 1:5 (2010) (discussing the origin and development of F-Cubed litigation).
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“The Great Crash” in 1929 caused a sense of fear and instability among
the investing public who questioned the soundness of the nation’s
financial institutions. 2 Stock prices on the New York Stock Exchange
had fallen dramatically in October 1929, culminating in a close of 198
points from a previous high of 381 points in September 1929. 3 While
many factors were blamed for the crash, the most commonly accepted
reasons were the lack of clarity, honesty, and availability of reliable
financial information regarding securities that were being sold. 4 The
lack of such information was believed to have prevented investors from
making informed investment decisions. In his address to Congress on
May 29, 1933, President Roosevelt articulated a need for regulations
requiring that “every issue of new securities to be sold . . . be
accompanied by full publicity and information . . . .” 5 Shortly thereafter,
Congress passed, and the President signed, the Securities Act of 1933,
also known as the Truth in Securities Act or more commonly, the ‘33
Act. 6
The ‘33 Act required the registration of the offering and sale of any
securities that are to be sold using the means and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, unless an exemption applies. 7 The following year
brought the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“‘34
Act”). 8 Placed in section 2 of the ‘34 Act were the reasons set forth for
regulation of the securities market, including, but not limited to,
requiring “appropriate reports, remov[ing] impediments to and
perfect[ing] the mechanisms of a national market system for securities . .
. .” 9 Among the most important sections of the act is the antifraud
2. See Stock Market Crash of 1929, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/566754/stock-market-crash-of-1929 (last
visited June 19, 2011).
3. Id.
4. James M. Landis, Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959) (discussing the political and financial atmosphere
following the market crash of 1929).
5. Id.
6. See Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (2006)).
7. Id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a (containing the ‘33 Act registration requirement). See §
4(2) for exemptions from registration (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d
(2006)).
8. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
78a-78oo (2006)).
9. Id. § 2.
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provision under section 10(b). 10 Rule 10b-5, promulgated under section
10(b) allows for criminal and/or private party causes of actions against
individuals that scheme to defraud or make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact, or to engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security. 11 Generally considered the workhorse of public and
private securities enforcement, Rule 10b-5 allegations are often brought
as class-actions and occasionally by foreign investors for the purchase of
foreign securities traded on foreign exchanges, a phenomenon known as
“foreign-cubed” (“f-cubed”) litigation. 12
B. THE ‘33 AND ‘34 ACT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF F-CUBED LITIGATION
The mechanism for a foreign investor seeking to avail itself of U.S.
law for fraud in the issuance of foreign securities listed on a foreign
exchange is found in the interplay of the following sections: under
section 11 of the ‘33 Act, a material misrepresentation or omission in a
registration statement will subject an issuer and others associated with
an issuer (underwriters and dealers) to rescissory damages (return of
purchase price of the security) in a suit brought by purchasers of said
securities pursuant to the registration statement. 13 Under section
12(a)(1) of the ‘33 Act, an issuer who sells or offers to sell a security in
violation of section 5 by failing to register said offering or failing to
successfully secure an exemption can be liable for rescissory damages as
well. 14 Finally, under §17 of the ‘33 Act, the SEC can bring civil and
criminal actions against a party who issues securities and “employ[s]
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud[.]” 15 Assuming a foreign
issuer fails to register its offering with the SEC, and that offering
somehow (even in a minute manner, as will be examined further)
purportedly affects the securities market in the United States, under
foreign-cubed jurisprudence, suit may be brought in a U.S. court by

10.
11.

(1948).
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. § 10(b).
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See Securities Act § 11.
See id. § 12(a)(2).
See id. § 17.
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foreign plaintiffs. 16
The most common action brought pursuant to the ‘34 Act is under
Rule 10b-5. 17 This rule provides for wide-sweeping coverage of
purchases or sales of a security where a “means or instrumentality” of
interstate commerce is used to defraud an investor or by the means of
making an “untrue statement” or omission of material information. 18
Often considered the “catch-all” fraud provision under the securities
laws, Rule 10b-5 allows foreign investors to seek actual (rather than just
rescissory) damages for statements or omissions made in connection
with the sale or purchase of a security by arguing that such foreign
transactions fit within f-cubed framework. 19

II. FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS AND THEIR ACTIONABILITY UNDER
THE ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES LAWS
F-cubed actions are generally brought against foreign issuers of
securities on behalf of foreign investors who purchased these securities
on a foreign exchange. 20 While initial thoughts may be that such claims
should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction21 or forum
non-conveniens, 22 courts over the years developed a framework to see if
and when such claims should be heard in a U.S. forum. 23 In a similar
context, under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court had permitted the
selective application of statutory extraterritorial application of U.S. laws
to foreign defendants when it was decided that the activity alleged
affected U.S. markets. 24 Such a phenomenon is often referred to as
16.
17.

See supra note 1.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78a, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006). See
also James P. Jalil, Proposals for Insider Trading Regulation After the Fall of the
House of Enron, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 689, 703 (2003) (referring to Rule 10b5 as the “workhorse of securities enforcement.”).
18. Id.
19. See 6 THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
412 (2009).
20. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1948) (codifying the common law concept of forum non
conveniens).
23. Langevoort, supra note 1, § 1:5.
24. See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, The Continuing Evolution of
Securities Cases, 2009 WIS. L. REV 465, 468 (2009) (discussing the two most recent
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“jurisdiction to prescribe.” 25 That authority was often cited as
warranting extraterritorial reach for U.S. securities laws. 26
A. SECOND CIRCUIT DEVELOPS TESTS TO GUIDE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIES LAWS
1. Development and Application of the “Conduct Test”
Prior to Morrison, 27 the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be applied in cases of securities fraud.
In this void, the lower courts had developed their own set of tests for
determining the extraterritorial application of the securities laws. 28 One
factor that courts looked to, known as the “conduct test,” was articulated
in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., in which Judge Friendly held that
there was “no reason to extend [the ‘34 Act] to cases where the United
States activities are merely preparatory or take the form of culpable
nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison to those abroad,” but
rather conduct related to the fraud must have occurred within the United
States. 29 The Court posited that when “a court is confronted with
transactions that . . . are predominantly foreign, it must seek to
determine whether Congress would have wished the precious resources
of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to
them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries” to adjudicate on
their own. 30
Judge Friendly held that the amount of activity that occurred within
the United States was irrelevant when the securities in question were
sold to purchasers within the United States. 31 He was essentially
looking for substantial conduct related to the fraud to have at least
occurred in the United States in order to justify an extraterritorial
application of the securities laws to sales that occurred outside of the
Supreme Court decisions on jurisdiction to prescribe).
25. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
237 (1987).
26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
27. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
28. Id. at 2889 (discussing the development of the “conduct” and “effects” tests).
29. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975) (emphasis
added).
30. Id. at 985.
31. Id. at 987.
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United States on foreign exchanges from foreign issuers. 32 The test
itself was not very clear and often led to court interpretations that relied
on determining whether the conduct in question had an adverse effect on
American investors and the American securities markets. 33 Shortly after
the decision in Bersch, the District Court in the Southern District of New
York stated that not only must there be some sort of conduct in the
United States, it also cannot simply be preparatory conduct, but rather
the conduct must have used the United States as a base of operations for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices leading to a more difficult
standard to satisfy. 34
Building on the Second Circuit’s decision in Bersch, the Third
Circuit held two years later that even if the sole victim was a foreign
entity it would “grant jurisdiction in transnational securities cases where
at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occur[ed]
within this country.” 35 Failure to apply the law would, from a policy
perspective, “embolden those who wish to defraud foreign securities
purchasers or sellers to use the United States as a base of operations.” 36
As the test developed further, various courts interpreted the rules to look
for different factors within each case. Recently, the court in Terra
Securities ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc. articulated the test in a
manner combining the factors of previous cases to decide whether the
conduct had occurred in the United States and whether it was sufficient
to warrant extraterritorial jurisdiction. Among the various factors the
court considered were:
(1) the conduct in question in relation to plaintiff’s theory of fraud;
(2) the location of the relevant conduct; (3) the timeline of relevant
acts; (4) the materiality or substantiality of the relevant conduct; (5)
the causal connection between the domestic conduct and the alleged
losses; and (6) considerations of “reasonableness gauged by the
intent of congressional policy and principles of fairness in the

32.
33.

Id.
George K. Chamberlin, Annotation, Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Securities
Fraud Action Based on Foreign Transactions, Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
56 A.L.R. FED. 288 § 4(b) (1982).
34. Venture Fund (Int’l) N.V. v. Willkie Farr and Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550,
555 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (referring to Judge Friendly’s decision elaborating on the conduct
test in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1016, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975)).
35. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977).
36. Id. at 116.
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Moreover, the court expressed that the factors were not to be “weighed
independently of the others; rather they must be considered in
conjunction.” 38 This decision was the exact opposite of a 1983 Second
Circuit decision that held that a plaintiff need only satisfy either the
conduct or the effects test to support a finding of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 39
2. Development and Application of the “Effects Test”
While courts were consistently applying and developing the
“conduct test,” it was often done alongside a test that purported to test
the effects such a transaction had on domestic markets. This came to be
known as the “effects test.” In 1968, the Second Circuit held that
extraterritorial application also applied to transactions that occurred
“outside the United States, at least when the transactions involve stock
registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are
detrimental to the interests of American investors.” 40 Here the court
took an expansive view of the term “effects” and in its determination
took into consideration the harm that could occur to the stock price of
the American subsidiary of a Canadian corporations stock when certain
frauds and misrepresentations were made to affect the value of the
Canadian stock. 41 This outlook was tempered by the court’s holding in
Bersch stating that “adverse effects on this country’s general economic
effects or American security prices” was not sufficient to apply
extraterritorial jurisdiction to the foreign defendants. 42
As discussed earlier, the securities laws were passed in part to
restore confidence and stability and to help support fair and honest
37. Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 303, 309
(S.D.N.Y 2010).
38. Id.
39. See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983).
40. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
41. Id. at 208-09 (holding that “ impairment of the value of American investments
by sales by the issuer in a foreign country, allegedly in violation of the Act, has in our
view, a sufficiently serious effect upon United States commerce to warrant assertion of
jurisdiction for the protection of American investors and consideration of the merits of
plaintiff’s claim”).
42. See Choi & Silberman, supra note 24, at 475-76 (citing Bersch and discussing
the tempering of the decision in Schoenbaum).
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markets. 43 However, such a Wickard-like application of this test, as
found in Schoenbaum, was overly broad in that almost any securities
transaction that occurred outside of the United States could have
conceivably been determined to have had an economic impact on
domestic markets and securities prices. 44 In general, the courts tended
to use a somewhat tempered view when determining the effects of
securities misrepresentations outside of domestic markets. In In re
Parmalat Securities Litigation, the district court held that even though
false statements were made outside the United States regarding a foreign
corporation’s offerings, the representatives knew that American
investors would rely on such information, thus satisfying the effects
test. 45
A more obvious effect on the American markets was on display
when a defendant knowingly illegally acquired and operated an
American subsidiary and subsequently incorporated the subsidiary’s
earnings into its financial statements, which were then distributed to
Canadian investors. 46 Such illegal conduct negatively impacted the
price of both Canadian and American shares, thus satisfying the effects
test. 47 Interestingly enough, when the District Court in the Southern
District of New York was confronted with the issue of American
purchasers of unsponsored American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”) 48
of a foreign corporation (that were trading exclusively on a foreign
exchange via an over-the-counter transaction), the court held that since
the securities offered were exclusively in Europe by a European
corporation on a European exchange “lacking any nexus to American
securities markets, [the facts in question were] not enough to satisfy the

43.
44.

See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (applying a very broad
interpretation of the commerce clause to prevent a farmer from growing wheat for his
own consumption outside of price supporting regulation; insisting that allowing such
conduct would broadly impair the overall market for wheat and therefore permitted the
restraint of such behavior).
45. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
46. In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
47. Id.
48. The stocks of most foreign companies that trade in the U.S. markets are traded
as American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”). U.S. depository banks issue these stocks.
Such investments are often not authorized by the foreign company. See American
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
Depositary
Receipts,
SECURITIES
http://www.sec.gov/answers/adrs.htm (last visited June 19, 2011)
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effects test.” 49 While the conclusion seemed logical, the opposing
argument could have just as easily been successful given the breadth of
the Schoenbaum test.
If a foreign corporation has no interest (at least in a specific
transaction) in being involved in American exchanges or markets and
additionally has not authorized the trading of its stock on OTC markets,
it should not be dragged into American courts for transactions that
occurred outside its purview. 50 On the other hand, the court basically
put Americans who have an interest in trading such securities on notice
that they must be aware of the risks, rewards, and uncertain remedies
that could come with such an investment. 51
3. Jurisdiction to Prescribe (Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Laws)
As a general rule, legislation does not reach foreign defendants
acting in foreign territories. 52 The Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law section 402 states that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to . . . conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place
Section 403 then discusses the
within its territory . . . .” 53
reasonableness of prescribing jurisdiction when certain factors are
present. 54 Factors cited include, but are not limited to, the link of the
activity to the regulating state, the interest another state may have in

49. In re European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. Sec. Litig., 703 F. Supp. 2d
348, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quotation altered); see also Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp.
2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that unauthorized ADRs purchased in over-thecounter market by American investors failed to have “substantial” effects on domestic
markets).
50. “OTC” or Over-the-Counter markets are inter-dealer trades of securities that
are not listed on national securities exchanges. Such securities have differing or nonexistent reporting requirements in the United States and are not as heavily regulated as
the national exchanges. See Over-the-Counter Markets, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrotc.shtml (last visited June 19,
2011); see also OTC 101, OTC MARKETS, http://www.otcmarkets.com/learn/
market-structure (last visited June 19, 2011).
51. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
52. 48 C.J.S. International Law § 18 (2010) (except in respect to American
nationals, the Constitution of the United States and the laws passed in pursuance thereof
have no force in foreign territory).
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§402 (1987).
54. Id. §403.
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regulating such activity, and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by
another state. 55 Most importantly, the “presumption that federal law is
not meant to have extraterritorial effect is applicable in all cases,
whenever a party seeks to give any federal legislation extraterritorial
effect, including cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act.” 56
The inconsistent application of this presumption is reflected by contrary
outcomes in foreign-cubed cases.
In a heavily cited opinion involving the application of Title VII, the
Supreme Court held that “[i]t is a longstanding principle of American
law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.” 57 The Court continued that this “canon of construction . . . is a
valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be
ascertained” and serves to protect against unintended clashes between
“our laws and those of other nations which could result in international
discord.” 58 Although the case mentioned was a Title VII action, the
decision of which was later overturned by statute, the concept is still
applicable and was cited by the Court in the Morrison decision. 59
The Supreme Court later stated that while “[a]cts of Congress do
not ordinarily apply outside our borders . . . [w]hen it desires to do so,
Congress knows how to place [foreign territories] within the
jurisdictional reach of a statute.” 60 Until the enactment of the “DoddFrank” bill post-Morrison, neither the ‘33 Act nor the ‘34 Act made any
mention of extraterritorial application. 61
III. MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK - SECURITIES LAW
EXTRATERRITORIALITY DECIDED
A. BACKGROUND
On June 24th, 2010 the Supreme Court finally issued a decision
concerning the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act, turning
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. §403(2)(a), (g), (h).
79A C.J.S. Securities Regulation § 123 (2010).
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
Id.
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 174 (1993).
See Dodd-Frank, infra note 128; Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(2006); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006).
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decades of precedent on its head. 62 In Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, the Court addressed an action brought by four Australians 63
against what was at one point the largest bank in Australia. 64 The
plaintiffs alleged that in 1998, National Australia Bank (“NAB”) bought
co-defendant Homeside Lending Inc., a mortgage servicing company, in
order to expand NAB’s operations. 65 Homeside’s business plan
depended on the presumption that mortgages would not be prepaid or
terminated in any fashion, so that its clients would continue to require its
services. 66 As a subsidiary of NAB, Homeside’s valuations were
dependent on this presumption and subsequently appeared in NAB’s
consolidated financial statements. 67 On July 5, 2001, NAB announced a
“write-down” of Homeside’s assets by $450 million citing increased
mortgage prepayments. 68 The following quarter brought about another
write-down of $1.75 billion. 69
Following the ensuing decline of NAB’s share price on the
Australian exchange, as well as a corresponding drop of its
(unsponsored) ADRs, plaintiffs brought an action in District Court for
the Southern District of New York alleging Homeside’s financial
models fraudulently predicted prepayment at “unrealistically low”
levels. 70 The complaint alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the ‘34 Act 71 and of SEC Rule 10b-5.72 Plaintiffs alleged that NAB’s

62.
63.

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
Id. at 2876 (ironically, Morrison, the Petitioner’s namesake, himself an
American, had his case dismissed for failure to state damages, but he continued to be
named as the petitioner in the case).
64. Id. at 2875.
65. Id.
66. Risks can include prepayment for or risk of overall default on the loan being
serviced; in such situations, servicing would no longer be necessary for the loan in
question. See JEFF MADURA, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 214 (Michelle
Baird et al. eds., 8th ed. 2008).
67. For a description of why and how corporations create consolidated financial
statements, see BELVERD E. NEEDLES, JR. ET AL., FINANCIAL & MANAGERIAL
ACCOUNTING 630-38 (8th ed. 2008).
68. A write down is allowed when an investment is deemed impaired. See STEVEN
M. BRAGG, WILEY GAAP POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 150 (2d ed. 2008).
69. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875-76.
70. Id. at 2876.
71. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78a, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78oo (2006).
72. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
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management was aware of this material fallacy and failed to act. 73
Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
for failure to state a claim. 74
The District Court dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the conduct alleged was “at
most, a link in the chain of an alleged securities fraud scheme that
culminated abroad.” 75 Moreover, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ claim
that but-for the domestic conduct the fraud would not have occurred, did
not fit into the Rule 10b-5 framework. 76 The petitioners, all Australians,
had sought to represent a class of foreign purchasers of NAB’s shares in
a period prior to the write-down.
B. SUPREME COURT DECISION
Prior to announcing the unanimous decision, Justice Scalia
addressed a threshold issue regarding an error that the lower court had
made (based on decades of erroneous precedent) regarding whether the
question of securities law extraterritoriality was in fact an issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction. 77 The Court clarified that the decision of
whether section 10(b) reached extraterritorial conduct was actually a
merits questions, whereas the question of subject-matter jurisdiction
refers “to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.” 78 While the result in the
lower Morrison decision would not have changed, the court felt it
necessary to clarify that it is without question that the District Court had
the jurisdiction to hear the case under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. 79 The Court
refused to remand stating that doing so “would only require a new Rule
12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion. 80

73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
See In re Nat’l. Aus. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL
3844465, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
76. Id.
77. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
78. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id. (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted versus lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction).
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C. PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
After addressing the issue of procedural housekeeping, the Court
reiterated its earlier decisions regarding the general application of
American law outside of the United States territories. 81 The Court,
quoting its decision in Aramco and other cases, reaffirmed the notion
that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none.” 82 This statement set the tone for the rest of the
opinion. 83 Justice Scalia proceeded to note that regardless of how many
times the Supreme Court had recited the presumption against
extraterritoriality in their previous opinions, the Second Circuit, and
other circuits following suit, essentially disregarded this precedent and
felt it necessary to “discern whether Congress would have wanted the
statute to apply” extraterritorially, thereby “divining” a set of tests that
were “complex in formulation and unpredictable in application.” 84 The
Court noted that until 1967 the district courts in the Southern District of
New York had stayed within the letter of the law by not interpreting
securities laws as applying outside of the United States. 85 However, the
Second Circuit’s reversal of the District Court in the Schoenbaum case
set the courts on a path to an application that would soon be expanded in
subsequent cases, essentially “excis[ing] the presumption against
extraterritoriality” from federal jurisprudence. 86
Justice Scalia mentioned the development of the conduct and
effects tests, with palpable sarcasm, referring to them as the “north star
of the Second Circuit’s section 10(b) jurisprudence, pointing the way to
what Congress would have wished.” 87 Moreover, the Court mentioned
that while other Circuits had adopted the test, albeit with their own
variations, one Court of Appeals had criticized the test and its
“interpretive assumptions” but still decided to defer to the Second
Circuit because of its “preeminence in the field of securities law[.]” 88
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 2877-78
Id. at 2878.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2878-79.
Id. at 2879.
Id. at 2880 (noting Judge Bork’s observation that a “more natural inquiry might
be what jurisdiction Congress in fact . . . conferred” rather than assuming (citing
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).
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Concurring with the many scholarly criticisms that had been
volleyed against the Second Circuit’s line of reasoning, the Court
reiterated the wisdom and simplicity of a presumption against
extraterritoriality stating that “[r]ather than guess anew in each case” the
presumption should be adhered to and provide for the legislative process
to take its course. 89
Continuing in its analysis, the Court maintained that since Rule
10b-5 was promulgated under section § 10(b) of the ‘34 Act, it is subject
to the contours of section § 10 and “[t]herefore, if section § 10(b) is not
extraterritorial, neither is Rule 10b-5.” 90 After examining the text of the
statute, the Court concluded that textually, nothing in the statute points
to extraterritorial application.91 Rejecting the Solicitor General’s
position that the definition of “interstate commerce” as defined by
section § 10(b) includes “trade, commerce, transportation, or
communication . . . between any foreign country and any State
(emphasis added),” the Court held that that this reference to interstate
commerce does not defeat the presumption against extraterritorial
jurisdiction as set forth in Aramco. 92 “[E]ven statutes that contain broad
language in the definition of commerce that expressly refer to ‘foreign
commerce’ do not apply abroad.” 93 However, the Court affirmed that
liability is possible if an issuer abroad publishes information in the
United States, or otherwise uses the means and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce to make material misrepresentations that ultimately
affect the price of their shares traded on a domestic exchange. 94
The petitioners and the Solicitor General offered two other bases
that support extraterritorial application. 95 The first is that Congress, in its
legislative history of the ‘34 Act, observed that “such transactions are
generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and
foreign countries,” thereby suggesting it intended extraterritorial

89. Id. at 2880-81 (citing articles that are critical of the Second Circuit’s approach
to extraterritorial jurisdiction).
90. Id. at 2881 (internal quotations omitted) (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521
U.S. 642, 651 (1997)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2882.
93. Id. at 2882 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
251 (1991)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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application. 96 The second is that § 30(b) of the ‘34 Act provides that
“[t]he provisions of the [‘34 Act] shall not apply to any person [that] . . .
transacts . . . without the jurisdiction of the United States,” unless they
transact with the purpose of evading the regulations promulgated under
the Act.” 97 The Solicitor General argued that such a law would be
meaningless if extraterritorial application did not already apply to the
securities laws. 98
The Court responded to the first argument by noting that the same
section quoted by the Petitioners and Solicitor General also limited its
reach to “transactions . . . conducted upon securities exchanges . . . [that]
are affected with a national public interest” (emphasis added). 99 The
Court asserted that such an interest does not pertain to foreign
exchanges, and thereby failed to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality. 100 Moreover, the Solicitor General’s inference that a
foreigner’s evasion of the securities laws indicate extraterritoriality,
while possible, is not sufficient to override the presumption. 101
In sum, the Court quoted from the ‘34 Act an actual provision “for
[] specific extraterritorial application,” stating that the purpose of which
“would be quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already
applied to transactions on foreign exchanges,” thus confirming its
textual analysis of the extraterritorial application of section 10(b), and
effectively ruling against it.” 102
D. CLARIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF
§10(B) AND ITS PROPER APPLICATION
The Court then turned to the Petitioner’s alternate argument that the
Respondent’s alleged deceptive conduct and misrepresentations had
occurred in Florida and that such action mitigated the need to find an
The Court
extraterritorial application of the securities laws. 103
96.
97.
98.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (the Court specifically points to the fact that the amicus curiae brief for the
United States makes no mention of a regulation promulgated under §30(b)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2883.
102. Id. (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78dd(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo
(2006)).
103. Id. at 2883-84.
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responded that “it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial applications
that lacks all contact with the . . . United States,” stating that the
presumption against extraterritoriality would be utterly anemic if its
application was dismissed anytime there was some minutiae of domestic
contact. 104
In Aramco, the Court looked to what Congress’ concern was at the
time legislation was enacted, rather than the historical events leading up
to it. 105 The ‘34 Act applies to deceptive conduct and misrepresentations
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange” (failing to mention that the location of the
deception is dispositive when determining application of the law),
therefore invoking the presumption against extraterritorial application. 106
The Court makes clear that section 10(b) seeks to regulate only
“purchase-and-sale transactions” and the respective parties to those
transactions only when they are in securities listed on domestic
exchanges. 107 Moreover, the Court adds this phrase in section 10(b)
referring to securities registered on “national securities exchanges”
would be nonsensical if the presumption against extraterritoriality didn’t
apply. 108 The phrase could have read more simply “all purchases and
sales of securities” and covered all securities sold in all territories. 109
The Court also refers to the ‘33 Act’s registration requirement and how
the SEC had interpreted the rule “not to include offer and sales that
occur outside the United States.” 110 Given that the ‘33 Act and the ‘34
Act were enacted within one year of each other and the ‘34 Act
requirements seem to naturally follow out of the securities registered
under the ‘33 Act, the Court naturally assumed that its jurisdiction did so
as well.
Finally, the Court turned to the issue of international comity, when

104.
105.

Id.
Id. (noting that in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991),
even though the Title VII plaintiff had been hired in the United States and was a U.S.
citizen, the employment situation in question had occurred outside of the United States;
Congress’ clear intent was on domestic employment and had effectively barred the
claim from being heard).
106. Id. (citing to Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 78j(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo
(2006)). See also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
107. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883-84.
108. Id. at 2885.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing to 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2009)).
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it stated that if “Congress intended such foreign application it would
have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and
procedures.” 111 Citing from the amicus curiae briefs of multiple nations,
the Court discussed how each country has its own judicial processes, the
likes of which will not always correspond with that of the United
States. 112 Moreover, the Court discussed how foreign apprehension at
section 10(b)’s application abroad without a bright-line test would
interfere with a foreign nation’s securities regulation and overall judicial
sovereignty. 113
Ultimately, restricting the ‘34 Act’s application for transactions
occurring in the United States or involving securities listed on a
domestic exchange reflects the jurisprudential concerns of the Court. 114
The Court rejected the significant conduct test used for decades by the
Second Circuit and applied by the SEC, 115 explaining that the Court’s
function is “to give the statute the effect its language suggests” and
nothing more. 116 This decision later came into the sights of Congress
while they were drafting the Dodd-Frank Act.
IV. THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
A. BACKGROUND: THE CREDIT CRISIS
In the years following a U.S. housing bubble fueled by, among
other things, easy access to credit, the U.S. economy weakened while
the housing market went into a free-fall, the recovery of which would be
years in the making. 117 One of the most significant factors in the
111.
112.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2885-86 (referring to the amicus curiae briefs for the United Kingdom,
Australia, France, and various foreign chambers of commerce, financial associations,
and foreign corporations).
113. Id. at 2886.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2887-88 (citing to earlier SEC decisions In re United Sec. Clearing Corp.,
52 S.E.C. 92, 95 n.14, 96 n.16, (1994) and In re Robert F. Lynch, Exchange Act
Release No. 11,737, 8 SEC Docket 75, 77 n.15 (1975)).
116. Id. at 2886 (citing to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae referring to the
possibility of the United States becoming a “Barbary Coast” for securities fraud).
117. See Ruth Mantell, Home Prices Off Record 18% in Past Year, Case-Shiller
Says, MARKETWATCH, Dec. 30, 2008, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/homeprices-off-record-18-in-past-year-case-shiller-says.

590

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

housing crisis and ensuing economic meltdown was the wide availability
of credit to non-creditworthy individuals in the form of subprime
mortgages. 118 Many corporations became enamored with the subprime
market and the billions that came with originating and subsequently
securitizing these loans. 119 The market for such asset-backed securities
was insatiable. The banks that were heavily invested in mortgage
backed securities took the largest losses. 120 Case in point: Lehman
Brothers and its eventual demise.
B. LEHMAN FAILS; OTHERS GIANTS BEGIN TO FALTER
Following a weekend of intense negotiation with Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson, government officials, and executives from
some of the largest banks in the nation, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
was not able to find itself a buyer. 121 Lehman subsequently filed a
petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in what would
become the “largest failure of an investment bank since the collapse of
Drexel Burnham Lambert 18 years ago.” 122 Underscoring the impact of
this crisis, Merrill Lynch & Co Inc. was purchased by Bank of America
for $50 billion after suffering significant losses due to the plummeting
value of its CDO (collateralized debt obligation) portfolio. 123
C. A CALL TO ACTION
During the next few months, Wall Street, and the financial services
118. See Mara Lee, Subprime Mortgages: A Primer, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 23,
2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9085408 (discussing
subprime mortgages). See also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT (2011), available at http://fcic.gov/report.
119. See generally ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, UNDERSTANDING THE
SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT (2008), available at http://www.ny.
frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr318.pdf.
120. See Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited June 19, 2011).
121. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1; see also Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds With Record $613
Billion Debt, MARKETWATCH, Sept. 15, 2008, available at http://www.marketwatch.
com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid=rss.
122. See Sorkin, Lehman Files, supra note 121.
123. See id.
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sector in general, suffered massive losses leading to the government
bailout of many banks that were considered “too big to fail.” 124 These
events, having had many economic repercussions around the globe, led
legislators to call for stronger and more thorough government oversight
of the financial markets. On June 17, 2009, in a speech to financial
industry representatives at the White House, President Obama called for
“a sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a
transformation on a scale not seen since the reforms that followed the
Great Depression.” 125 The following day, the Treasury Department
released a plan with recommendations as to what changes were needed
in order to ensure future stability and restoration of “confidence in the
integrity of our financial system.” 126
Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) and Senator Chris Dodd (DCT) spearheaded the initiative to pass legislation in their respective
chambers of Congress. The earliest provisions closely paralleled the
Obama administration’s plan for financial reform. 127 After months of
contentious debate and intense media coverage, the House of
Representatives passed a version of the financial reform bill, known as
the “Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” 128
(“Dodd-Frank” or the “Act”) on December 12th, 2009. 129 The Senate
followed suit, and on May 20th, 2010 voted in favor of the bill. 130
Thereafter, President Obama signed the Act into law on July 21, 2010—

124. For a thorough (and occasionally riveting) analysis of the Financial and
Subprime Credit Crisis, see generally ANDREW R. SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE
INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM – AND THEMSELVES (2009).
125. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Twenty-First Century Financial
Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform/. See also Obama’s
Financial Reform Plan: The Condensed Version, WASHINGTON WIRE,
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/06/17/obamas-financial-reform-plan-thecondensed-version/tab/article/ (last visited June 19, 2011).
126. See THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009),
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS113933 (last visited June 19, 2011).
127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
128. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
129. See H.R. Res. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).
130. S. Res. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).
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almost a month to the day after the Morrison decision. 131
D. THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S IMPACT ON SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS
In its final form, the Act comprehensively addressed a host of
financial regulatory concerns including, for example, the orderly
liquidation of unsound institutions 132, the regulation of hedge funds and
derivatives 133, and the protection of consumers. 134 For our purposes,
however, we draw upon sections 929p and 929y of the Act, discussed in
further detail below.
1. Section 929p - Strengthening Enforcement by the Commission
Section 929p(b)(1) explicitly provides for the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the securities laws under section 17(a) of the ‘33 Act, for
alleged violations involving “(1) conduct within the United States that
constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only
foreign investors,” or “(2) conduct occurring outside the United States
that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.” 135
The law effectively codified the “conduct and effects” test extensively
relied upon by the Second Circuit for the past four decades prior to its
abrogation by the Supreme Court in Morrison. 136 In addition, section
929p(b)(2) codified the “conduct and effects” test with respect to any
alleged violations of the antifraud provisions under the ‘34 Act. 137
Finally, section 929p(b)(3) codified the conduct and substantial effects
test for violations of section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of
1940. 138
131. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, July
21,
2010,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/
22regulate.html?hp.
132. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 128, § 204(a).
133. See id. § 723(a)(3) (adding §§ 2(h)(1)(A) and 2(h)(2)(B)(i) to the Commodity
Exchange Act, which require clearing of swaps and regulation of swap dealers); see
also id. § 731 (requiring registration and regulation of swap dealers).
134. See id. § 1011 (establishing the independent Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection with the Federal Reserve Board).
135. Id. § 929p(b)(1).
136. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
137. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 128, § 929p(b)(2).
138. Id. § 929p(b)(3).
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2. Section 929y - Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action
Interestingly, under section 929p, the Act only authorizes
extraterritorial jurisdiction for actions brought “by the Commission or
the United States,” and not private party actions. Section 929y,
however, cures this apparent defect by mandating the SEC to “solicit
public comment and thereafter conduct a study to determine the extent
to which private rights of action under the antifraud provisions” should
be extended to cover conduct or transactions outside the United
States. 139
The SEC, under the direction of Congress, is tasked with analyzing
multiple issues, including:
(1) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it
should extend to all private actors or whether it should be more
limited to apply only to institutional investors or otherwise;
(2) what implications such a private right of action would have on
international comity;
(3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of
action for transnational securities frauds; and
(4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be adopted.

140

The report is to be submitted no later than eighteen months
following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. 141

V. IMPLICATIONS OF AN EXTENSION OF THE CONDUCT AND EFFECTS
TEST TO PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
A. DODD-FRANK IS INEFFECTIVE IN ITS ATTEMPT
AT RESURRECTING F-CUBED LITIGATION
A convincingly strong case could be made that Section 929p of
139. Id. § 929y. See Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-63174 (Oct. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/other/2010/34-63174.pdf, for further information on the comments being solicited
and important dates.
140. Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, supra note 139.
141. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 128, § 929y(c).
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Dodd-Frank has not effectively reversed the core holding of Morrison.
The Dodd-Frank Act states in relevant part that “[t]he district courts of
the United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall
have jurisdiction. . . alleging a violation . . . even if the securities
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign
investors . . . .” 142
Significantly, the legislative text makes no mention of any change
in the application of the securities laws. Rather it only speaks directly to
a court’s ability to hear a case, a power fully recognized by the majority
in Morrison. 143 In a recent publication, the attorney for the respondents
in Morrison argued that “[t]he [section 929p] provision unambiguously
addresses only the ‘jurisdiction’ of the ‘district courts of the United
States’ to hear cases involving extraterritorial elements; its language
clearly does not expand the geographic scope of any substantive
regulatory provision.” 144 Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote in Morrison that
“[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction . . . refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a
case,” summarily finding that the district court enjoyed subject matter
jurisdiction over the dispute. 145 The more probing question of “what
conduct section 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct section 10(b)
prohibits,” Scalia continued, “is a merits question.” 146 Congress, in an
act of oversight in the Dodd-Frank Act, therefore failed to satisfactorily
address the threshold issue in Morrison – namely, the extraterritoriality
of the U.S. securities laws.
Simply ‘extending’ a court’s jurisdiction to extraterritorial
application in foreign cubed cases does not suffice and may (and should)
ultimately render section 929p irrelevant unless an amendment is passed
to clarify the applicable scope of the securities laws. Admittedly, the
Act was poorly and hastily drafted because the legislative history of the
Act, found in the Congressional Record, reveals that “the provisions
142.
143.

Id. § 929p(b)(2) (emphasis added).
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia ruled that the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The extraterritorial reach of the securities laws,
he added, must be treated as a merit-based (and not jurisdictional) issue. See Morrison
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
144. George T. Conway III, Extraterritoriality After Dodd Frank, THE HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritoriality-after-dodd-frank/
(last visited June 19, 2011).
145. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (internal quotations omitted).
146. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

2011]

MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK:
LIFE AFTER DODD-FRANK

595

concerning extraterritoriality . . . are intended to rebut [the Supreme
Court’s presumption against extraterritoriality] by clearly indicating that
Congress intends extraterritorial application in cases brought by the SEC
or the Justice Department.” 147 And while “given the drafters’ extrastatutory statements, some judges may be tempted to find substantive
extraterritorial[ity],” the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
courts:
must adopt the interpretation of the statute that is most faithful to its
text . . . [i]f Congress enacted into law something different from
what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its
intent . . . [i]t is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its
148
drafting errors. . . .

It may be possible that this careless drafting has to do with the fact
that the total number of lawyer-legislators in Congress has been on the
decline, thereby possibly causing a disconnect between legislative intent
and judicial interpretation. 149
Whatever the reason may be for this careless mistake, a district
court hearing this case already has precedent, in Morrison, to follow in
determining whether there is extraterritorial application to the securities
laws. Without a clear amendment stating that the securities laws apply to
what are essentially purely foreign transactions, a court should rule

147. 156 CONG. REC. H5235, H5237 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep.
Paul Kanjorski), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.
cgi?position=all&page=H5237&dbname=2010_record.
148. Harbison v. Bell, 129 S.Ct. 1481, 1494 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
149. Compare 110th Congress Lawyers-Legislators: U.S. Senate, ABANET.ORG,
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/lawyerleg110thsenate_nofooter.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 2, 2010) (listing the percentage of the 110th Senate that are lawyers at
59%) and 110th Congress Lawyers-Legislators: U.S. House of Representatives,
ABANET.ORG,
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/lawyerleg110thhouse_nofooter.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 2, 2010) (listing the percentage of the 110th House of Representatives that
are lawyers at 40%), with 111th Congress Lawyers-Legislators: U.S. Senate,
ABANET.ORG,
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/documents/lawyers111congress_senate.pdf (last visited
Dec. 2, 2010) (listing the percentage of the 110th Senate that are lawyers at 58%) and
111th Congress Lawyers-Legislators: U.S. House of Representatives, ABANET.ORG,
http://new.abanet.org/calendar/ABAday/Documents/LawyersCongressHouse2010.pdf
(last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (listing the percentage of the 110th House of Representatives
that are lawyers at 36%).
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against the application. Borrowing from Justice Scalia’s reasoning in
Morrison, in order for a law to apply extraterritorially it must have “a
clear statement of extraterritorial effect (emphasis added).” Any
amendment referencing jurisdiction and not application of the law only
speaks to the power of the court to hear the case, and not whether it can
apply the law to particular facts. 150
Further support for this argument may materialize when we see
how the SEC interprets this amendment in prosecuting cases of
extraterritorial fraud that occurred prior to Dodd-Frank’s enactment. If
the SEC argues that the Dodd-Frank amendment actually changes how
the courts rule on the merits of an extraterritoriality issue, rather than
subject-matter jurisdiction, then there may be a successful defense
against ex-post facto application of a law, subsequently causing cases to
be dismissed. However, if the SEC argues that it is merely jurisdictional
(i.e. that the amendment was written to address subject-matter
jurisdiction) then the case could be dismissed because Morrison rejects
extraterritorial application, even while already affirming jurisdiction.
Take for example the recent case of Fabrice Tourre, a former
Goldman Sachs employee who is being prosecuted under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws for his role in the development
and marketing of what the SEC alleges to be a fraudulent CDO. 151 On
September 29, 2010, Mr. Tourre’s counsel filed a motion for a judgment
on the pleadings arguing that the case be dismissed under Morrison
since the investment in question did not include any transactions that
occurred in the United States, was not listed on any exchange, and
moreover that the investor was a foreigner. 152 After responding, the
SEC was given the opportunity to file an amended complaint, doing so
on November 22, 2010, and arguing that Mr. Tourre gave “substantial
assistance [to Goldman Sachs] as it misled investors in a product linked
to subprime mortgages.” 153 Such an argument leads one to believe that
150.
151.

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (internal quotations omitted).
For a thorough explanation of the details and background of this action, see
SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud In Connection With the Structuring and
Marketing of a Synthetic CDO, SEC Litig. Release No. 21,489, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm (last visited June 19, 2011).
152. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229, 2010 WL 4520689 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2010).
153. Joshua Gallu, Goldman Sachs’s Tourre Facing New Claim in SEC Lawsuit,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1124/goldman-sachs-s-tourre-facing-additional-sec-claim-on-subprime-mortgages.html.
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the SEC is abandoning its fraud claim in light of Morrison, and is taking
a different approach, perhaps for the reasons mentioned above.
Therefore, given the apparent lack of effectiveness of section 929p,
foreign-cubed litigation brought in federal court should be dismissed
under Morrison. No extraterritorial effect can be provided to a statute
unless its provisions clearly provide for its application not only
jurisdiction. Unfortunately for the drafters of Dodd-Frank, their
hastiness in bringing this amendment to vote likely ended up with a bill
as impotent as the Second Circuit jurisprudence it was based on.
B. CONTINUED LACK OF CLARITY: THE NEED FOR A SAFE HARBOR
Assuming the courts reject the above-proffered interpretation of
how the Dodd-Frank amendment was written, and embrace
extraterritorial application for securities laws enforcement, an
overarching issue is that, while Congress has seemingly attempted to
adopt the conduct and effects tests, what actually constitutes fulfillment
of these tests by a foreign issuer is unclear due to the differing court
positions on the issue and continued lack of legislative clarity.
Moreover, different circuits have applied the effects differently, with
some ruling that a satisfaction of both tests is required, whereas some
have held that the tests are mutually exclusive of one another. 154
This issue is extremely important as “[c]urrently, it is unclear to
what extent the effects test is applicable [and] [a]s a result, corporations,
issuers, lawyers, and the business community do not know what
constitutes a substantial effect or what behavior abroad might affect U.S.
securities.” 155 This has led to “foreign issuers hav[ing] taken great pains
to deny the sale of securities to U.S. investors” because they are “wary
of being haled into U.S. courts and subjected to broad U.S. discovery
procedures should the price of stock fall.” 156 Not only is this a detriment
to the issuers in that they cannot access the vast wealth of this nation,
barring U.S. investors from foreign investments has the effect of
preventing them from reaping potentially substantial returns, especially

154.
155.

See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
See John D. Kelly, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for a New U.S.
Jurisprudence with Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud
Provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 477,
493 (1997).
156. Id.
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with regard to emerging foreign markets who are desperately seeking
outside investment. 157 Therefore, if the courts do embrace the intent of
Dodd-Frank, and reject a textual reading of the statute, it is imperative
that the SEC, either through a rule or release, adopts a set of factors that
would provide foreigners a safe harbor to follow in order to avoid costly
litigation in U.S. courts. 158 Such a rule would likely ease the concerns of
many foreign issuers, who would have an official guide to look to which
provides for more foreign opportunities for domestic investors.
C. ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY
Finally, going beyond the textual argument that can be made
against extraterritorial application, there are common sense
jurisprudential arguments as to why jurisdiction should not be extended.
A major issue is comity and whether other nations would respect and
enforce the judgments of U.S. federal courts on issues that may have
been better off litigated in their respective courts. 159 Applying the
securities laws broadly to foreign transactions would “interfere with the
regulatory systems of other countries . . . [causing] U.S. interference [to]
generate confusion and multiply the costs to investors and issuers. 160 In
addition it would cause “tension between the United States and other
countries . . . [possibly leading] other countries [to] retaliate, seeking to

157. “Growth in emerging markets will accelerate faster than in developed nations
as economies mature and leaders are quicker to make structural changes.” Cordell
Eddings & Tom Keene, Emerging Market Growth Gap to Widen, El-Erian Says: Tom
Keene, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 9, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0709/emerging-developed-world-growth-gap-will-widen-el-erian-says-tom-keene.html.
158. The SEC has much experience providing issuers with safe harbors to follow,
especially with foreign securities. See Regulation S -- Rules Governing Offers and Sales
Made Outside the United States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933,
http://taft.law.uc.edu/CCL/33ActRls/regS.html (last visited June 19, 2011) (providing
an example of an SEC safe harbor affecting foreign issuers).
159. “Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
160. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking The
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 914 (1998).
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regulate activities of U.S. parties that impact their countries.” 161 Courts
seeking to apply extraterritorial jurisdiction “must [also] consider the
political impact of applying U.S. law on international relations, U.S.
foreign policy, and the development of multinational business.” 162
Finally, extraterritorial application could “produce undesirable results
such as redundant and unnecessarily costly systems of overlapping
regulation, [that] would thereby impede the free flow of capital across
borders.” 163 The SEC must consider these potential political and
economic ramifications when applying extraterritorial jurisdiction for
both public and (after the conclusion of the Congressionally-mandated
study) private actions.
Looking at the number of amicus briefs that were filed in favor of
the respondents in the Morrison case, it is clear that there is a large
group of foreign nations that reject U.S. extraterritoriality in this
aspect. 164 The possibility for confusion and conflict of laws between
nations is immense in today’s global economy. Therefore it is
imperative that practitioners, academia, and foreign nations voice their
disapproval with this expansion of U.S. judicial power and urge the SEC
in this open comment period to restrict extraterritorial application of the
securities laws to both governmental and private party causes of
action. 165

161.
162.

Id.
Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign
Tender Offers, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 523, 554 (1993).
163. Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The
Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 102 (2003).
164. Among the groups that filed amicus briefs in support of the respondent are the
U.K., Australia, France, the New York Stock Exchange, Euronext, The Swiss Bankers
Association, Economiesuisse, The Federation of German Industries, The French
Business Confederation, The Institute of International Bankers, The European Banking
Federation, the Australian Bankers’ Association, Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America, the United States Council for International
Business, the Association Francaise des Entreprises Privees, GC100, European
Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. N.V., Alstom SA, Lagardere Groupe SCA, Thales
SA, Technip SA, Vivendi SA, and law professors.
165. See Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, supra note 139.
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CONCLUSION
While it is clear that Congress intended to extend the reach of the
securities laws and the SEC’s ability to enforce them, careless drafting
and a lack of clarity probably preclude Dodd-Frank from having the
intended effect. Moreover, if the Dodd-Frank amendment is not
interpreted by courts textually, but rather by looking to Congress’
legislative intent, the SEC should clarify the boundaries and limits of the
“conduct” and “effects” tests for the sake of predictability and
uniformity among the courts. Finally, for the sake of international
comity, restraint should be used when applying laws extraterritorially.

